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Respondent Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & 
Reading (hereinafter "Morgan")/ hereby responds to 
Appellants1 Petition for Rehearing: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CODRT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
PROBATE HEARING WAS CONDUCTED IN A 
JURIS PRUDENTIAL MANNER 
The Appellants (hereinafter "the Atkinsons") claim, that 
Judge Fishier did not properly perform his duties in 
approving the settlement agreement, is without merit. The 
Atkinsons provide no proposal as to what they claim Judge 
Fishier should have done. Having reviewed the settlement 
agreement, the pleadings and documents submitted to him, and 
having questioned the Atkinsons, Judge Fishier made a proper 
judicial determination that the rights of the minor child 
were adequately protected and in fact, ordered the Atkinsons 
to post a bond to ensure that the minor child would be 
fairly treated. 
The Atkinsons' claim of judicial misconduct against 
Judge Fishier is without merit. 
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POINT II 
THIS COORT DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT GRANTED TO MORGAN 
The Atkinsons claim that "fact issues abound" as to 
whether or not Morgan was their lawyer. However, the so 
called disputed "facts" have been considered both by the 
trial court and by this Supreme Court and found to be 
insufficient to create a "genuine controversy" 
See Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 69 P.2d 1390 (Utah 
1980) . 
The only "facts" presented by the Atkinsons is the 
continued claim that they understood Morgan to be their 
lawyer. As has been previously shown in Morgan's 
Respondents1 Brief, during oral argument, and by the opinion 
of this court, such a claim by the Atkinsons flies in the 
face of all the facts and evidence to the contrary. 
Further, the Atkinsons admit that they were not 
represented by Morgan in their Petition for Rehearing 
stating : 
...the trial court judge relied upon 
the evaluation of a 19-year old 
boy...and his 16 year old wife. 
(Both of whom were unrepresented by 
counsel.) (emphasis added) 
(Petition for Rehearing, p. 3). 
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This respondent respectfully submits that should this 
court allow the Atkinsons1 claim of malpractice against 
Morgan to proceed, it would be difficult if not impossible 
for an attorney in Utah to safely deal with a pro se 
opposing party without the danger of facing the same claims 
that the Atkinsons are making. 
The crux of the Atkinsons' request to this court is to 
find that all a disgruntled pro se party has to do is to 
assert, "we thought he was our lawyer", and regardless of 
how illogical such a claim would be under the circumstances, 
and no matter if all the evidence is to the contrary, such a 
claim should nevertheless go to a jury. 
It is a fact of legal practice that lawyers must, at 
times, deal with pro se parties. This will, as occurred 
herein, require meetings with a pro se party, reviewing 
documents with a pro se party, and appearing in court at the 
same time as a pro se party. These actions do not create a 
"lawyer-client" relationship. 
As to the case law cited in connection with the 
Atkinsons1 constitutional claims, the citations are not 
relevant for the reason that there are no material facts 
that are in dispute or genuinely controverted. Further, the 
Atkinsons1 constitutional claims are raised for the first 
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time in this Petition for Rehearing and thus, even if they 
had merit, are raised untimely. 
A 
THERE ARE NO GENOINE ISSUES OF 
FACT IN DISPUTE 
The Atkinsons' claim to provide this court with 
"evidence" of disputed issues. However, the Atkinsons cite 
only the same statements the Atkinsons made after filing 
suit, to the effect that they understood Morgan to be their 
lawyer, which statements are directly contrary to the 
evidence. 
This court held in Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1979) that a defendant cannot rely merely upon her 
allegations to avoid summary judgment but must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. This the Atkinsons have failed to do. 
Further, it is important to note that even VE^ a genuine 
fact issue existed as to whether or not Morgan was the 
Atkinsons1 lawyer, summary judgment was still correctly 
granted by the trial court because the Atkinsons failed to 
provide any evidence by expert testimony or otherwise that 
any action on the part of Morgan violated the applicable 
standard of care. Also, there is no testimony or evidence 
in the record, expert or otherwise, on the issue of 
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causation. There is no causation between the actions of 
Morgan and the alleged damages of the Atkinsons. The only 
damages claimed are the "inadequate settlement", and the 
terms and conditions of the settlement were agreed upon by 
the Atkinsons and I.H.C. prior to the time of Morgan's 
involvement. 
In Abdul Kadir v. Western Pacific Railroad, 7 Utah 2d 53 
318 P.2d 339 (Utah 1957) this court held: 
We are in accord with the idea that 
the right of trial by jury should be 
scrupulously safeguarded. This of 
course does not go so far as to 
require the submission to a jury of 
issues of fact merely because they 
are disputed. If they would not 
establish a basis upon which 
plaintiff could recover, no matter 
how they were resolved, it would be 
useless to consume time, effort, and 
expense in trying them, the saving 
of which is the very purpose of 
summary judgment procedure. 
318 P.2d at 341. 
The Atkinsons' request for a rehearing based on disputed 
"facts" is without merit and should be denied. 
B 
THE ATKINSONS RELIED ON THEIR OWN JUDGMENT 
AS TO THE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT, 
The Atkinsons claim that they relied on the judgment of 
Judge Fishier as to the fairness of the settlement and 
therefore, take issue with this court's opinion that they 
Atkinsons did not rely on the probate judge. 
It should first be noted that the Atkinsons' argument 
presupposes that Judge Fishier was in error and that the 
settlement agreement was inadequate or unfair. There is 
nothing in the record to support such a supposition. The 
basis of the settlement agreement was that the Atkinsons' 
child was injured while in the care of a hospital operated 
by I.H.C. A dispute existed as to whether or not the injury 
was caused by any negligence of the hospital or health care 
providers. To resolve this disputef negotiations took place 
between I.H.C. and the Atkinsons. The Atkinsons were 
assisted in their negotiations by George Atkinson, a union 
negotiator at Kennecott. In response to a settlement 
proposal prepared by I.H.C, George Atkinson prepared a 
sophisticated ten page counterproposal. Eventually a 
settlement was reached which was considered fair and 
adequate by all the parties. (R. 156, 269-270, 651, pp. 20-
26, R. 644, p. 115). 
Judge Fishier carefully reviewed the documents, 
questioned the Atkinsons and thereafter approved the 
settlement. 
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The Atkinsons' statements as to the reliance on the 
findings of Judge Fishier as a basis for granting a 
rehearing is without merit. 
C 
The Atkinsons' arguments as to whether or not they were 
mislead about the settlement addresses matters involving 
I.H.C. and not this respondent. 
D 
MORGAN DID NOT PROVIDE "LEGAL ADVICE* 
TO THE ATKINSONS 
This court correctly stated that "Morgan's explanation 
of the probate proceedings, when viewed in the concept of 
this case, did not constitute the rendering of legal 
advice." 
Morgan was retained by I.H.C. to prepare the relevant 
settlement documents on behalf of I.H.C. to present to the 
probate court. If the Atkinsons had chosen to obtain 
counsel, Morgan would have met with opposing counsel to 
review the documents and to ensure their approval by the 
opposing party, and would have appeared in court with 
opposing counsel. However, the Atkinsons did not have an 
attorney and Morgan had no choice but to meet with them to 
review the relevant documents and appear at the same time as 
-7-
the Atkinsons before the probate judge. These actions did 
not make Morgan the Atkinsons1 lawyer and does not 
constitute the provision of "legal advice". Morgan merely 
made statements of fact as to what the documents were and 
the fact that court approval was necessary. 
The Atkinsons claim that a "jury may infer that the 
Atkinsons thought they were getting legal advice." 
(Petition for Rehearing, p. 15). These speculations do not 
change the facts. The Atkinsons' arguments as to Morgan 
rendering "legal advice" are without merit and should be 
rejected. 
E 
THE ATKINSONS CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY 
AND CHOSE NOT TO OBTAIN LEGAL COUNSEL 
The Atkinsons take issue with the court's findings that 
"the Atkinsons... apparently did discuss a settlement with an 
attorney of their choosing." However, the Atkinsons 
admitted the same to Judge Fishier in open court: 
THE COURT: And your name, Sir? 
MR. ATKINSON: Roger W. Atkinson. 
THE COURT: Have you sought the 
advice of legal counsel in this 
matter? 
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MRS. ATKINSON: I have talked with 
someone about it but we are not 
planning on getting a lawyer. 
THE COURT: Have you talked to a 
lawyer? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yesf I have just 
asked him a few things about it, and 
he said we really should not — we 
shouldn't have to sue them if they 
are giving us an offer. 
As this court correctly stated in its opinion, the 
above-cited statements clearly show that the Atkinsons did 
not consider Morgan to be their lawyer, that these 
statements do not refer to Morgan and that the Atkinsons had 
consulted with an attorney and decided not to retain an 
attorney on the advice of that lawyer, (who presumably told 
them that they wouldn't have to sue if they are being given 
an offer). 
Morgan, in discussing this statement of Mrs. Atkinson 
testified in his deposition: 
A: ...I assume by that statement 
she had talked to another 
lawyer because I never made 
that statement to her. 
Q: Did you ever ask Mrs. Atkinson 
what she meant by that 
statement which you just read 
to me? 
A: No. 
Q: And you say that you never told 
her that she shouldn't sue them 
because they made an offer? 
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A: Absolutely not. That is a ri-
diculous statement. 
(R. 652, pp. 45-46). 
The Atkinsons now claiming that they were referring to 
Morgan when making these statements concerning a lawyer, 
flies in the face of logic and makes no sense under the 
circumstances. The Atkinsons1 attempts to explain away the 
obvious are without merit and do not constitute sufficient 
reason to grant their Petition for Rehearing. 
POINT III 
MORGAN DID NOT HAVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
The Atkinsons1 statement in their Petition for Rehearing 
that: "even if there was no attorney/client relationship, 
Morgan still had a duty to advise the Atkinsons of his 
conflict of interest" is a paradox. As has been previously 
briefed, no attorney/client relationship existed between the 
Atkinsons and Morgan. The Atkinsons1 claim of a "conflict 
of interest" is solely based on the following statements by 
Roger Atkinson: 
Q: You didn't ever ask him [Morgan] 
if this is a good or bad deal isn't 
that true? 
A: I think not. I think I did ask 
him that. 
Q: What did he say? 
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A: I don't recall. I think he 
asked us back Tf we thought it 
was fair. (emphasis added) 
(R. 644, pp. 118-119). 
First, Mr. Atkinson was not certain that the 
conversation ever took place. He also did not recall what 
Morgan's response was but merely stated that he "thought" 
Morgan asked the Atkinsons if they thought it was fair. 
Even if the conversation took place as the Atkinsons 
"thought", it may have taken place, the Atkinsons admit that 
Morgan did not provide any opinion on the fairness of the 
settlement. In fact, Morgan could not have given such an 
opinion since he was at no time aware of the details of the 
injuries or the negotiations that resulted in the 
settlement. Morgan had no basis upon which to evaluate or 
judge the fairness of the settlement nor was it his duty to 
do so. 
The Atkinsons' reliance on an affidavit of Richard 
Henriksen is also misplaced. The affidavit in question was 
not timely and properly filed, and did not specifically 
address the matters at issue. The affidavit merely dealt in 
generalities and hypotheticals, none of which applied to or 
referred to Morgan or the factual issues before the trial 
court. 
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Morgan did not have a conflict of interest. Morgan was 
at no time the Atkinsons1 attorney nor did he at any time 
offer legal advice to the Atkinsons or provide an opinion as 
to the adequacy or fairness of the settlement. 
Finally, under the circumstances it would have made no 
sense for Morgan to advise the Atkinsons to obtain counsel. 
It was clear by the facts presented to Morgan, that they had 
chosen not to do so. For the Atkinsons to allege in their 
Petition for Rehearing that "if Morgan had advised the 
Atkinsons to obtain an independent attorney, there would 
have been another ending to this story" is without merit 
and should be rejected as a basis for granting the Petition 
for Rehearing. 
POINT IV 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD KING IS IMPROPER 
Finally, it should be noted that the Affidavit of 
Richard King filed in support of the Petition for Rehearing 
is improper. The Affidavit attempts to raise issues, not 
only for the first time on Appeal, but for the first time on 
Petition for Rehearing. Further, the Affidavit does not 
provide relevant or useful information. What Dr. King 
appears to be saying is that the Atkinsons have found 
themselves trying to explain away previous statements, such 
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as their statements before Judge Fishier, in an attempt to 
fit the claims they are now making against Morgan, and that 
after reviewing the inconsistent and illogical explanations 
of the Atkinsons, Dr. King has reached the conclusion that 
perhaps they were or perhaps they were not telling the 
truth. 
Furthermore, this Affidavit is based on assumptions and 
suppositions made by Dr. King. Finally, if this Affidavit 
is viewed in whole or in part as an attempt by Dr. King, a 
psychologist, to testify as to the standard of care or of 
the actions of Morgan in the field of law, to that extent 
the Affidavit is further improper and inadmissible pursuant 
to this court's holding in Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1985). The Affidavit of Richard King should be 
rejected as a basis for granting the Petition for Rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Morgan was retained by I.H.C. to provide legal services 
to I.H.C. specifically to draft documents in connection with 
a settlement agreement and present them to the probate court 
for approval. No attorney/client relationship existed at 
any time between Morgan and the Atkinsons, either express or 
implied. Morgan did not provide any legal services or give 
legal advice as a volunteer or otherwise to the Atkinsons. 
All of Morgan's legal services were performed for the 
-13-
benefit and on behalf of I.H.C. as reflected on all of the 
pleadings and documents. 
Judge Fishier verified with the Atkinsons that they were 
not represented by counsel, that they had consulted with an 
attorney, not Morgan, and had chosen not to obtain 
counsel. Judge Fishier acted properly in approving the 
settlement. At no time has there been any evidence that the 
settlement was inadequate. 
The Atkinsons have utterly failed to show the existence 
of any of the required elements of a legal malpractice 
claim. Even if a question of fact did exist as to whether 
or not Morgan was their lawyer, at no time has there been 
any evidence presented by expert testimony or otherwise that 
Morgan acted below the standard of care. The settlement 
agreement which is the subject of this lawsuit was 
completely agreed upon by the Atkinsons and I.H.C. prior to 
Morgan's involvement. There is no causation between any act 
of Morgan and the only claim of damages by the Atkinsons, 
specifically the terms of the settlement agreement. 
The Atkinsons' Petition for Rehearing is without merit 
and this respondent respectfully requests that the same be 
denied. 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., a/k/a Intermountain Health Care 
("IHC") opposes the petition for rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the 
Petition for Rehearing and of the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j); see also Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
FACTS 
Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson, individually and 
as guardians ad litem for Chad Atkinson (collectively, the 
"Atkinsons"), alleged (1) that the settlement of approximately 
$1 million for Chad Atkinson, approved more than four years 
before the Atkinsons brought this suit, should be reopened or 
reconsidered and (2) for alleged attorney malpractice (see 
Record ["R."] 415-18). The trial court granted summary judg-
ment, and this Court unanimously affirmed. Atkinson v. IHC 
Hospitals, 138 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (S.Ct. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO ERROR OF LAW HAS BEEN MADE; 
NO ERROR WILL BE REPEATED, 
Quoting limited portions of this Court's opinion, the 
Atkinsons assert that this Court has overlooked the mandate of 
the Legislature that a court must "determine[]" that a trans-
action is in the best interests of the protected person. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-5-409(2). Careful review of the probate court 
opinion, this Court's opinion, the statute and the transcript 
of the proceedings of the probate court2 reveals no error. 
The probate court had the text of the settlement 
terms and release available to review and the parents to ques-
tion about their understanding of the terms. The probate court 
was adequately and properly apprised. Even the Atkinsons1 
partial quotation, with significant ellipses, from this Court's 
opinion does not impose new standards or shirk from statutory 
responsibilities. There is no error of law which may be 
repeated to the detriment of "hundreds" of future litigants. 
After quoting 42 Am. Jur.2d Infants, § 154 (1969) and 
referring to Kansas and Tennessee cases4 about evaluating 
settlements of infants' claims, the only "evidence" which the 
Atkinsons quote to try to demonstrate that the probate proceed-
ings were inadequate is one question addressed to Judge Fish-
ier at his deposition. He answered that he did not evaluate 
the underlying claim against IHC. (Fishier Dep. at 51.) 
A copy of the probate court's decision is attached as 
Addendum F to the brief on appeal of Respondents Morgan and 
Morgan, Scally & Reading (the "Morgan Brief"). 
2
 See Transcript of Settlement, Fishier, J., July 22, 
1983 ("Tr.") attached as Addendum A to Morgan Brief. 
3
 Addenda C, D and K to Morgan Brief. 
4
 Western Life Ins. Co. v. Nanneyr 290 F.Supp. 687 (CD. 
Tenn 1968); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Lasca, 99 P. 616 (Kan. 
1909). Petitioners also refer to Perrv v. Umbercrer, 65 P.2d 
280 (Kan. 1909). 
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Neither Am.Jur.2d nor the cited cases require an 
evaluation of the underlying claim — this supposed requirement 
is imposed only by the Atkinsons in their argument. The 
factors enumerated by the cited authorities were all well-
covered by Judge Fishier's review of the nature of the injury 
(brain damage), the amount recovered ($900,000 [guaranteed]5), 
the fact that both Mr. and Mrs. Atkinson believed the child had 
a claim against IHC, their understanding that they could not 
sue IHC again regardless of changes in the child's condition 
and the terms and conditions of the settlement and recovery, 
which provided, in part, that the child's injuries "are or may 
be permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is 
uncertain and indefinite. . . . " (Addendum C to Morgan Brief.) 
The probate judge was entitled to consider whether 
the parents thought the settlement reasonable in making his own 
determination, but that is not, as the Atkinsons imply, the 
only thing he considered. The judge was also entitled to 
impose conditions for the child's interests — which he did by 
requiring the parents to be bonded and to submit annual 
reports. Judge Fishier stated in his affidavit: 
Among other things the Court verified with 
the parents that they did not intend to 
obtain an attorney and that they had con-
5
 The settlement guarantees $900,000 plus certain free 
medical care for the child. If the child lives to age 65, the 
settlement will be worth at least $1.28 million. IHC has 
complied with the settlement requirements and has made and 
continues to make timely payments. 
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suited with an outside lawyer, (see page 2 
of the transcript, lines 7 thru 14 [sic].) 
7. The affiant ascertained that both par-
ents desired to complete the settlement as 
they had agreed with Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., and that they felt that it was 
in the best interest of the child and them-
selves, and that upon hearing their testi-
mony, the Court concluded that it was in 
the interest of the minor and the parents 
to complete the settlement terms which had 
been agreed between the parties. 
Fishier Affidavit, Addendum P to Morgan Brief, emphasis added. 
Moreover, the Petition for Appointment of Conservator 
and Order to Approve Settlement recited that the "child sus-
tained accidental injuries while in the care" of an IHC hospi-
tal and that the injuries from a plugged breathing tube 
"involved brain damage, to an extent which has not been ascer-
tained at this time. . . . " (Addendum B to Morgan Brief.) 
Judge Fishier had ample information before him. 
Nothing in the proceedings deprived the child of the 
benefit of some $900,000 for his brain damage, free medical 
care (which has been extensive), funds for education. The 
parents also received money. Every reasonable precaution was 
taken to assure that the funds would be used for the child in 
accord with the structured settlement. 
It is the Atkinsons who err by trying to assert that 
approval was granted without, for example, consideration of the 
settlement agreement and release, which they brought to the 
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probate court. As this Court correctly concluded, everything 
was done in a jurisprudential manner. 
II. THE PETITIONERS1 CONTENTIONS AND 
ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT. 
1* The Parents1 Age Is Irrelevant. 
The Atkinsons claim that their age and recently 
alleged illiteracy at the time the settlement was approved 
require new proceedings. Mr. Atkinson, the father, was then 
19, having reached his majority. He was legally competent to 
vote, to enlist in the military, to marry and to have left 
compulsory schooling. His parents no longer had any obligation 
to support him. He was old enough to be appointed as the 
guardian of his child and to be trusted to manage, together 
with his wife, approximately $1 million in benefits and pay-
ments for his child. He had a tenth-grade education but now 
asserts, without proof, that he was barely able to read. The 
law imposes no literacy test on marrying, on fathering, or on 
parenting.7 
See, inter alia, United States Constitution, Amendment 
XXVI, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78-45-3. 
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 The Court specifically asked Mrs. Atkinson if she 
understood that she would have no future claim against IHC even 
if the child's condition worsened, and she said she did. (Tr. 
at 2.) Significantly, the Atkinsons allege only Mr. Atkin-
son's near illiteracy, avoiding the question whether Mrs. 
Atkinson was truthful when she said she understood. Mr. 
Atkinson was able to answer oral questions, showing his per-
sonal understanding of the questions asked. (Tr. at 3-4.) 
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Mrs. Atkinson, aged 16, was a married woman, willing 
to give birth and willing to apply for and accept the court-
ordered guardianship (with her husband) of her child. She is 
the beneficiary of years of effort by women to be recognized as 
persons, not chattel, under the law.8 The Court s;hould not 
ignore laws according rights to women. This is not the case 
nor the time to reverse statute and precedent. The Atkinsons1 
allegations about age and illiteracy are not persuasive and do 
not justify rehearing. 
No one ever questioned the Atkinsons' right as par-
ents to keep their child, nor have there been any allegations 
of their inability to serve as his parents and his legal guard-
ians or to provide his daily nurture. Had there been no injury 
to their child, the law would have had no concern with his 
care, unless they violated child support or criminal statutes. 
The law permits young and old parents to raise their 
children; it should not, because of the Atkinsons1 age, favor 
them with relief from a settlement they supported in court. 
The Atkinsons should not benefit from age discrimination. The 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 63-3-1 et seq. 
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 Indeed, if persons of their respective ages had had a 
child born out of wedlock, they could have decided whether to 
marry, whether to place the child for adoption (terminating all 
parental rights) or whether one or the other would retain 
custody with the possibility of receiving support from and 
according visitation to the other. 
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Atkinsons cannot be permitted to pick and choose their rights, 
responsibilities and competencies. 
Moreover, the Atkinsons have failed to show any 
causal connection between their ages or their alleged illiter-
acy and the value of the settlement; there is no evidence that, 
had they been older or more literate, the settlement would have 
been larger or different. There is no evidence that the 
settlement itself is inadequate or unreasonable or could have 
been so discerned or proven. 
2. The Atkinsons Were Advised As They Chose> 
Mr. Atkinson's father, George Atkinson, described 
himself as a union negotiator, chosen to negotiate on behalf of 
his union with a major mining corporation. He offered a propo-
sal of settlement which was rejected by IHC. The fact that the 
Atkinsons did not hold out for the terms of George Atkinson's 
alternative proposal does not mean that they failed to follow 
George Atkinson's advice or did not have its benefit. 
Even the most experienced and competent of lawyers, 
arbiters and negotiators win some cases and lose others. The 
fact that George Atkinson's proposal did not prevail does not 
mean that a different proposal was unfair or fraudulent. Most 
negotiators ask for more than they expect; it is only specula-
tion when the Atkinsons now argue they acted without George 
Atkinson's advice because his views did not prevail. 
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No one has reviewed (and no one needs to review) the 
reasonableness of the position George Atkinson urged during 
negotiations; no one has an obligation to prove that a rejected 
proposal was fair or reasonable or should have been imposed by 
a court. The fact that another proposal was made does not make 
that proposal fair, better or worse than the settlement approv-
ed by the Court. 
To attempt to build a case of fraud in ci court-
approved settlement on the fact that some other proposal was 
not accepted is to engage in chimera. No one knows or can 
establish what might have occurred had the Atkinsons refused 
any settlement other than that proposed by George Atkinson. 
IHC refused his terms and has no burden to show why it did not 
yield to them. 
No one knows at what point a refusal to compromise 
might have required court action by the Atkinsons. A jury 
might or might not have awarded $900,000 to their child. No 
one knows, and no one can know because there is no record of 
what might have been if. The Atkinsons1 argument requires the 
Court to indulge in speculation; that is improper in the judi-
cial process. 
3. The Atkinsons Chose Not to Be Represented by Counsel« 
IHC agrees with the position of Respondents Stephen 
G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading in their response to 
the petition for rehearing. The Atkinsons consulted an attor-
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ney but chose not to retain one. They were, with the aid of 
themselves and Mr. Atkinson's father, able to get approximately 
$1 million; there is no evidence that they might have gotten 
another sum otherwise. They might have gotten less and could 
have incurred large legal fees. 
IHC also agrees that the Atkinsons have no claim of 
legal malpractice. An attorney representing one party when the 
other side chooses to appear pro se should be under no obliga-
tion to assist the pro se opponent as the Atkinsons urge. 
4. The Probate Court Made a Proper Determination. 
The Atkinsons' abdication of responsibility — their 
argument that they relied on the judge to be sure things were 
fair — raises several considerations. The first is that the 
Atkinsons, after conversing with an unidentified attorney, felt 
no need to sue because a settlement had been offered to them. 
The Atkinsons chose whether to offer the settlement for confir-
mation; they asked to be appointed guardians without bond for 
that purpose. (R. 421.) Their choices indicate their exercise 
of judgment and responsibility. After negotiating for a guar-
anteed $900,000, it is disingenuous for them now to claim that 
they relied on the judge to protect their child. 
But, even if the Atkinsons did rely on the court, 
there is no evidence that their reliance on the court was 
misplaced, nor is there any evidence to show that the probate 
judge was concerned with anything other than the child's prot-
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ection. The fact that the judge required the Atkinsons to post 
bond and file reports evidences the propriety and breadth of 
the judge's concern for the child. The Atkinsons1 reliance on 
the judge does not require rehearing or reopening of the 
settlement. The Atkinsons have no proof that the settlement 
should not have been approved. 
5. Questioning the Judge Creates Serious Problems? of Legal and 
Judicial Policy* 
Judge Fishier's resignation from the bench provided 
the parties with the unusual opportunity to obtain the affi-
davit and deposition of a judge who sat on a case. Although 
some situations exist in which judges have been questioned 
about their judicial tenure (e.g., when criminal charges have 
been filed), IHC respectfully submits that it is a dangerous 
precedent to permit a disgruntled litigant to question a judge 
as part of an appeal or a collateral attack on a judgment. The 
judicial process provides litigants with an appellate procedure 
and prescribed forms of collateral attack by rule* and statute. 
To permit a judge — even one no longer active on the 
bench — to be questioned about the judicial process creates a 
sharp departure in legal proceedings and may be the precursor 
of naming judges as defendants and seeking to find them liable 
for a new claim of judicial malpractice. Judicial decisions 
should be challenged under settled principles of law and judi-
cial review, not on the recollections of judges about the 
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questions they asked or the thoughts they may have had in 
exercising their powers and applying their discretion. Such a 
departure in the judicial process should not develop from 
happenstance. A policy decision to modify the appellate 
process should arise from judicial rule or legislative enact-
ment; a constitutional amendment may be required. 
Despite the problems inherent in examining judicial 
memories, Judge Fishier's deposition and the affidavit give no 
reason why rehearing should be granted or why, ultimately, 
anyone should conclude that the settlement accepted by the 
Atkinsons for their child was not fair. Judge Fishierfs testi-
mony shows his proper judicial behavior with no violation of 
legal standard. 
6. The Affidavit of a Psychologist Should Carry No Weight. 
The affidavit of Richard King Mower offered by the 
Atkinsons in support of their petition should have no place in 
these proceedings. An attempt to raise a factual issue on a 
petition for rehearing is virtually unprecedented and certainly 
untimely. Moreover, the content of the affidavit offers 
nothing to assist the Court. It consists of quotations from 
court and deposition testimony and from this Court's decision, 
which Mr. Mower attempts to interpret. 
Research has yielded no precedent in which a psy-
chologist's analysis of a portion of the record has been 
substituted for the analysis of a judicial panel on a petition 
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for rehearing. The Atkinsons nowhere establish why Mr, Mower's 
inconclusive interpretation should be given deference or why 
his affidavit should be recognized by the Court on rehearing. 
Even if the Atkinsons1 statements were to be inter-
preted as Mr. Mower suggests and even if Mr. Mower is accurate 
that a juror could join him or oppose him on the s;ubjects about 
which he opines, his views fail to demonstrate a triable issue 
as to the underlying propriety of the settlement. In short, 
his statements, even if accepted as the views of an expert in 
psychology, fall far short of establishing anything with enough 
legal merit to justify further proceedings by this Court. His 
affidavit does not show any impropriety in the summary judg-
ment decision or in this Court's unanimous affirming opinion. 
Litigants should not be permitted to create or offer 
new facts or new disputes on a petition for rehearing, as the 
Atkinsons attempt with the Mower affidavit; this is another 
distortion of the appellate procedure and a distortion of the 
concept of "record". It is a distortion which cannot be per-
mitted without the approval of judicial rulemaking, legislative 
enactment or constitutional amendment. The judicial and appel-
late process should not so easily fall prey to untimely though 
imaginative efforts of counsel. 
7. There Is No Meritorious Constitutional Claim. 
Neither Mr. Mower's inconclusive views about the 
Atkinsons' statements nor his lay analysis of judicial reason-
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ing nor anything else argued by the Atkinsons creates a con-
stitutional issue at this untimely juncture. The standards for 
granting summary judgment are clear and were properly recog-
nized by this Court in affirming the trial court. Summary 
judgment has long been recognized as a proper and constitu-
tional means of resolving litigation, in no manner creating a 
denial of constitutional right to jury trial. Constitutional 
questions do not shine from the murky analysis and arguments of 
the Petitioners. 
8. Valid Justifications for Summary Judgment Remain Unscathed, 
The Atkinsons1 petition for rehearing purports to 
raise three issues about the case, none of which is valid, as 
demonstrated. The Atkinsons do not attack the numerous grounds 
for summary judgment which were previously argued and which 
still justify this Court's unanimous decision. The Atkinsons1 
attack on the settlement is barred by all possible limitations 
periods pertaining to medical malpractice claims. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-14-3(29), 78-14-8, 78-14-4(1). Their fraud and 
misrepresentation claims, insofar as they may be construed as 
separate from the underlying medical/injury claim, are barred 
by a three-year limitation period. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
26(3). Their fraud and misrepresentation claims are further 
barred by their refusal to rescind the settlement agreement — 
they have received and continue to retain its benefits. The 
Atkinson's claims were previously settled in open court, so 
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this action is collaterally estopped. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), see also Robertson v. Campbell. 674 
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983); Berrv v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 
1987). 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the Atkinsons 
refused an offer at no charge to have the child independently 
evaluated out of state. In open court, the Atkinsons ack-
nowledged that their child had brain damage. In open court, 
Mrs. Atkinson acknowledged that by settling they could not 
again claim against IHC, even if the child's condition wor-
sened. The release filed in open court recites the financial 
provisions of the settlement and also states that the extent 
and permanence of damage to the child may not be known. The 
parents acknowledged in open court that they believed their 
child had a claim, and Mr. Atkinson responded coherently when 
the $900,000 amount of the settlement was mentioned by the 
probate judge. All of these factors support summary judgment 
against the Atkinsons. 
There is no merit to any claim or argument by the 
Atkinsons to invalidate summary judgment against them; ample 
grounds for summary judgment exist and persist even against the 
speculative reasons the petitioners offer for reargument. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the mark of a competent and qualified judiciary 
that it attends carefully to allegations of error. However, a 
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mere allegation of error supported by purported facts raised 
post-appeal and alleged disputes over facts insufficient to 
prove the merits of an underlying claim do not justify reargu-
ment. The Atkinsons1 petition for reargument lacks merit and 
should be denied. IHC seeks such other and further relief, 
including costs, as may be just and proper. 
Dated: September 27, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
By:  V^ ) W j L ^ ^ ^ 
B. Llqyd pbelman 
David B. Erickson 
M. Karlynn Hinman 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., a/k/a Intermountain 
Health Care 
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The undersigned attorney for respondent IHC Hospi-
tals, Inc. a/k/a Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. 
hereby certifies that on September 27, 1990, she caused the 
foregoing IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Brief Opposing Petition for 
Rehearing to be served on all of the parties by mailing copies 
thereof by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to 
their attorneys, as follows: 
Paul S. Felt 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Carman Kipp 
Kipp & Christian 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Robert J. DeBry 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
is 37 Dated this Cx ( day of September, 1990. 
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M. Karlynn Hinman 
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